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BORDER CONFLICT AS A FACTOR IN
SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

27 December 1973

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The question under consideration is the significance and role of the territorial boundary dispute existing between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and its impact on both the two principals as well as the ramifications for the United States. The topic was approached through first, a review of the historical context in which it is seen the border rivalry goes back more than 300 years. Contemporary boundary exchanges between the USSR and the PRC were examined as a means of establishing the continuing and unresolved nature of the dispute. A detailed analysis and		

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enumeration of Sino-Soviet border-relevant actions is presented for the period, 1969-1973, with the conclusion that 1969 was the nadir of Sino-Soviet relations, and the boiling point insofar as actual clashes and military confrontations were concerned. 1969, additionally, represented a period in which frequent reports were circulated indicating the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war. Subsequent to 1969 there has been a quieting of conflict over the border, but the internecine struggle continues with both an ideological and military implementation. Implications for American foreign policy must proceed from an understanding that although the Sino-Soviet dispute weakens the two communist nations, viz-a-viz the United States, it is not a circumstance easily manipulated and probably suggests a continuance of watchfulness and efforts toward reduced rivalry.

Research methodology depended upon a review of existing secondary sources, with heavy emphasis on the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, The Peking Review, and the New York Times.

USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Essay)

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BORDER CONFLICT AS A FACTOR
IN SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY

by

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Military Intelligence

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8 January 1973

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your letter. Permission is granted for you to reproduce the Sino-Soviet border map which appeared on pp 68-69 of Strategic Survey 1969 in your War College essay. Full acknowledgment should be made both to Strategic Survey 1969 and to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Yours faithfully

Graham Mord

Publications Manager

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INTRODUCTION

In September of 1969, major newspapers throughout the Western world carried word that Soviet leaders were discreetly raising the possibility that the USSR might launch a preemptive nuclear strike against mainland China. The story gained credence in that it originated with Russian journalist (and purported unofficial spokesman for the Soviet government, from time to time), Victor Louis. Still other reports of the chance of a Russian-Chinese war were circulated that year and, although violently denied by the Soviet government,¹ the People's Republic of China hasn't seemed reassured.²

The increase in the tempo of Sino-Soviet hostility, along with the appearance of polemics in their dialog, has been well documented as various authorities have reviewed the milestones of Russian-Chinese friction. The departure of Soviet technicians in 1960 (pulled out of the PRC, according to Mao Tse-tung, to retard China's development); support of Albania in her quarrel with the USSR in 1961; the increasing divergence of positions on nuclear confrontation in 1962 and 1963; the bitter criticism of Russian withdrawal of missiles from Cuba in 1962; the basic difference in how "Wars of Liberation" should be supported; the increased aid to India by the Russians combined with what China felt was too little support for the government in the north of Viet Nam; the Russian-sponsored

invasion of Czechoslovakia and the most ominous implications of the "Brezhnev Doctrine;" and the recent reports of possible Soviet warming toward Taiwan, serve to but highlight the fundamental differences between the two nations.

During the course of the many points of friction reviewed above, another, much more fundamental dispute has simmered, occasionally boiling over, but never going away: the conflict of interests arising as a result of the common border dividing the Union of Soviet Socialist States, the People's Republic of China, and Russian dominated Mongolian People's Republic.

Simply stated, the Chinese position is that there are thousands of square miles of land presently occupied by the USSR which historically and ethnically belong to China.³ This land was lost to China as a result of "unequal" treaties forced upon her by coercion and military might. These "unequal" treaties are ones which China may recognize, abrogate, revise or negotiate should the occasion seem appropriate in Peking.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has no territorial claims against China and, if anything, has found herself on the defensive in refuting the irredentist demands of her southern neighbor. The Soviets did publicly proclaim as early as July of 1919: "The Government of the Workers and Peasants has . . . declared null and void . . . the treaties which were to enable the Russian government of the Tsar and his allies to enslave the people of the East and

principally the people of China."⁴ But this has not been interpreted by the USSR as ~~encompassing~~ those treaties fixing the present Soviet-Chinese border. The Russians aver only those treaties which exacted economic concessions and imposed political restrictions upon the Chinese were unjust and, thus, "unequal." Those treaties have been repudiated and cancelled by the Russians, whereas treaties relating to boundaries were never construed as negotiable.⁵

BACKGROUND

Scholarly opinion in the literature on the subject of the Sino-Soviet territorial discord offers an initial insight into a rather wide-ranging controversy. Dennis J. Doolin has taken the position that although the Chinese may have hoped for some redress in their border dispute with the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964, they have been disillusioned. His prediction of a continuance of the conflict has been borne out and, if anything, gone beyond earlier expectations.⁶

The ethnic overtones of the border embroilment have been particularly inflammatory, with one large section of China actually coming under the temporary reign of a so-called Turkestan Republic in the late 40's. O. Edmund Clubb has labeled the region where the "Republic" was formed, Sinkiang, as the site of most probable Peking-Moscow border trouble. He writes of Chinese efforts at achieving a "true ethnic amalgamation," predicts that soon Sinkiang will be more Chinese than Turki; that efforts at "reincorporating" the Mongolian People's Republic into the Chinese empire

will be made; and that the Chinese look ahead to making good various claims on the Russian borderlands.⁷

There are, undoubtedly, "vast" territories which were acquired by Tsarist Russia and the combination of what the Chinese view as a valid claim to stolen land, along with historic Russian views of the sacredness of the land of Mother Russia, adds up to a volatile equation. This view is shared by Editor John Gittings,⁸ as well as Colonel O. Ferdinand Miksche.⁹ Inescapably, Russian rhetoric and Chinese polemics, notwithstanding, present-day Soviet Central Asia was, up until the 18th century, part of China's Middle Kingdom's sphere of influence. In point of fact, the principal cities of Eastern Siberia, Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Komsomolsk, and Vladivostok, are all on former Chinese land seized by the Tsars. Consider Tannu Tuva (taken by force from China) and Outer Mongolia ("assisted" to "freedom" by Russia in 1911). These add up to a distinctly real grievance in the eyes of the Chinese and form an equally obvious threat to the Soviets who view China as a growing giant of 800 millions.

The problem is both short and long-ranged. There are threats of almost immediate nuclear attack by Russia on the PRC, combined with expert appraisals that any dispute arising out of such huge territories seized by one country from a second suggests settlement by war, not negotiation.¹⁰ This theme is repeated in an even more sensational form by Harrison Salisbury whose War Between Russia and China¹¹ while lacking the erudition of Dr. Tai Sung An, articulates a con-

sensus forecasting a worsening, not a betterment of relations:

The Soviet Union and Communist China still show no signs of wanting to relax their guard in dealing with each other. They repeatedly make their mutual animosity clear. There has been no progress whatever in the current high-level border negotiations in Peking. The Soviets have not shown any disposition to abandon the fruits of czarist imperialism, nor are the Chinese willing to drop and forget their territorial claims against the Soviet Union.¹²

The border dispute is a deeply rooted source of continuing dissension between the two former friends. It ranges over a more than 4,000 mile common boundary, it carries with it overtones of political, economic, military, ideological, and racial hostility. Moreover, the quarrel is not amenable to easy settlement and, in fact, carries the dragon seeds of a violent, nuclear cataclysm.

This monumental split, made strikingly visible by the pyrotechnics of border fighting, began hundreds of years ago when the first cossack penetrated to the Amur River in search of trade and land.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Boundary and territorial problems have existed between China and Russia for more than three-hundred years, with the first serious clash in the 1680's in the Amur River Valley, opposite Manchuria.

This armed exchange resulted in the first of the several treaties concluded in 1689 between the Chinese and the Russians, and the first ever to be made by China with a Western

Power. The Treaty of Nerchinsk of that year was the culmination of Russian inroads east of Lake Baikal which had begun some thirty years earlier at about the time of the establishment of Manchu Dynasty in 1644. The Manchus in extending their hegemony over the Amur River Basin met Russian Cossacks and defeated them. This led to negotiations and efforts by the Russians to obtain economic concessions and trade agreements with the Chinese. In the meantime, the build-up of superior military strength by the Manchus resulted in what became one of the few treaties between the two countries that was favorable to the Chinese.

As a means of clarifying the various territorial exchanges and agreements concluded between China and Russia, a time line incorporating a brief resume and the significance of the occurrence will be found in the appendix. It should be noted that while the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) was favorable to China, subsequent treaties and events were nearly always unfavorable. (Refer to "Chronology of Chinese-Russian Territorial Exchanges, 1647-1949," page 30.) To graphically portray the lands in dispute, a reprint of the notorious Liu Pei-hua "Chinese Territories Taken by Imperialism" map will also be found in the appendix, on page 47.¹³

It should also be pointed out that one area of agreement common to all modern Chinese regimes, whether Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, or Mao Tse-tung, has been the uniform position that large tracts of land have been extorted from China by "unequal" treaties. Sun Yat-sen wrote of the loss

of Taiwan, the Pescadores, Burma, Annam, the Amur and Ussuri river basins, and the areas north of the Ili, Khokand, and Amur rivers. Chiang adds to this plaint: "Indeed, after having witnessed the tragedy of the loss of the Liuchiu (Ryukyu) Islands, Hong Kong, Formosa, the Pescadores, Annam, Burma, and Korea, China was confronted with the great danger of imminent partition of her territory."; and Mao in 1936 is quoted as believing Outer Mongolia should automatically become a part of the People's Republic of China.¹⁴

With the overthrow of the Tsar and the establishment of The Government of Workers and Peasants (USSR) in 1917, it at first appeared China would have restored to her land taken by Imperial Russia. In a famous Soviet declaration, Leo Karakhan, Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, promised that the Soviet Union renounced "all seizures of Chinese territory and all Russian concessions in China, without any compensation and forever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's government and the Russian bourgeoisie."¹⁵

The Karakhan Declaration, however, has never been applied to correcting the territorial differences between the two communist states. And while the Chinese have not included the failure of the Russians to honor their pledge in any known charges, it undoubtedly is viewed by the Chinese as another of many examples of bad Russian faith. In fact, with the exception of generalized pronouncements such as the Sun Yat-sen-Chiang Kai-shek-Mao Tse-tung statements,

and the periodic release of extravagant geographical claims in the form of "historical" atlases (the Hsieh Pin map in 1925, the Liu Pei-hua maps released in '52 and '54, and re-released in both '63 and '64, and the most recent, the World Atlas which was published late last year), China has relegated its irredentism to a subordinate role subject to reopening at their option and at a time of their choosing.

Beginning in 1963, however, a significant reversal of the Sino-Soviet territorial problem emerged. This alteration was mainly one of Chinese thrust and began to assume the form of frequent and acrimonious accusations and charges.

The "Calendar of Sino-Soviet Territorial Exchanges, 1950-1968," found in the Appendix on page 33, reflects the continuing discord along the common border, but also reveals the generally academic and low-key nature of the quarrel. During this interval the world was told "more than 5,000 violations from the Chinese side have been recorded,"¹⁶ that the Russians were "provoking incidents on the Sino-Soviet border,"¹⁷ that the early Chinese had "waged wars of aggrandizement and plunder."¹⁸ China later announced in 1966 that the Russians had "refused to negotiate the Sino-Soviet frontier in the Far East,"¹⁹ and a year later the USSR complained:

There are serious grounds for the growth of distrust of China in the countries of the South and South-east Asia, and this distrust will continue to grow as long as the Peking leaders maintain their aggressive aims and refuse to accept the sovereignty and independence of the countries neighboring with China.²⁰

In 1968, the Soviet Union set the stage for increased

Chinese anxiety with an expansion of Soviet-Japanese economic ties (the Japanese remain a lurking menace in the Chinese mind) that could carry implications of tacit Russian endorsement of the "remilitarization" of that island nation.²¹ Further, in August of the same year, China received a second shock when Russia led the invasion of Czechoslovakia carrying a second implication that quite possibly the "Brezhnev Doctrine" could be applied to the Chinese ideological heretics. It was shortly after this time that the New York Times carried word in late August that "increased border deployment was being carried out by the Chinese."

But it was in the following year that a **new**, far more volatile phase in the Sino-Soviet border dispute was to unfold. During 1969, the outside world suddenly became aware of the internecine characteristics of what previously had been considered a fraternal quarrel. And during 1969, Russian and Chinese soldiers began shooting at and killing one another with all the intensity that only dedicated enemies can manifest.

THE BORDER CONFLICT, 1969-1973

Senior Lieutenant Ivan Ivanovich Strelnikov was killed at 1120 hours on the morning of 2 March 1969 on the small island of Damansky²² in the Ussuri River. With his death, and the deaths of thirty others of the border patrol he commanded,²³ began a **new** and at times bloody period in the Sino-Soviet border feud. The middle six months of 1969 would

provide the time frame for no fewer than sixteen relatively "major" border clashes in which Chinese and Russian forces deployed against each other ranged up to regimental size, supported by armor, artillery and helicopters. The intensity of the exchanges had not been seen before in modern times, nor has it been repeated. These border fights can be placed temporal context through review of the "Calendar of Sino-Soviet Territorial Exchanges, 1969-1973," in the Appendix on page 37, and can be visualized graphically on the map to be found on page 48.

While all of the border incidents involved fire fights and casualties, four of the sixteen fights were particularly serious: Damansky Island Island (2 March), Danansky Island (14-15 March), Pacha Island (8 July), and Yumin County in Sinkiang (13 August).

Damansky Island appears to have been provoked by the Chinese who infiltrated some 300 regular Army and frontier soldiers onto the island under cover of darkness during the evening of 1 March, then mousetrapped the Soviets into sending a comparatively small force to stop what appeared to be 20 or 30 unarmed Chinese shouting Maoist slogans as they approached the island across the ice-covered river. When LT Strelnikov and his men arrived, the Chinese "provocateurs" scattered and dropped to the ground, providing a clear field of fire for the hidden Chinese soldiers who sprung the ambush of the Russians with small arm, machine gun, mortar and anti-tank fire. It was not until a second Russian border

unit led by Senior Lieutenant Vitaliy Dmitriyevich Bubenin flanked the Chinese with two armored cars, engaged in hand-to-hand close combat, that the PRC troops withdrew. The Russians considered themselves the innocent parties in the two hour fight on Damansky Island, an uninhabited bit of land nominally under Soviet control, and in addition to the usual polemics and official charges went so far as to call on the talents of Yevgeni Yevtushenko, a politicized Russian poet, who dutifully came up with "On the Red Ussuri Snow," the text of which can be found on page 49.²⁴

The March 15 clash on Damansky was in some ways a reverse of the earlier firefight. This time the Russians appear to have set the trap (possibly for revenge, possibly to

leave no doubt as to which side controlled the island) in deliberately bivouacing a small element overnight on the island to decoy the Chinese. This succeeded and when the Chinese approached to challenge the Russians, a seven to eight hour battle ensued. Both sides were apparently ready for a fight and evidently had made advanced preparations, bringing up reinforcements and materiel. The Chinese eventually committed some 2,000 men, moving forward in APC's, supported by artillery fire. Counterattacking with tanks and armored cars, the Soviets directed artillery barrages against the numerically superior Chinese (described by Izvestia as outnumbering the Russians by ten to one). The Russians evidently forced the Chinese to withdraw and final casualty figures, while imprecise, reveal Russian losses of 60 to Chinese KIA and WIA numbering 800;²⁵

The third significant border action while in the same general area, moved from the Ussuri to the Amur River. Pacha Island (called "Goldinsky" by the Russians) is of especial note because, for the first time, the Russians are reported to have used gunboats and military aircraft. According to the Chinese, at 0830 hours on 8 July, Russian soldiers "unwarrantedly fired at the Chinese inhabitants and militiamen engaged in production on the Island." Fighting back in self-defense, the intruders were driven off, only to return later with first one gunboat and later two that "frantically opened fire on the Island." After using "heavy machineguns and cannon for six minutes," Soviet frontier troops landed and "set fire to one of the civilian houses and a forest." Later, "they sent aircraft to intrude in six sorties into the airspace above Pacha Island area and Pacha Village on the Chinese bank."²⁶ As might be expected, the Russian account differs and, among other variations, "gunboats" become "river transports."

At 10:30 a.m. on July 8 this year, a group of armed Chinese, having violated the USSR state border and concealed themselves in the Soviet part of Goldinsky Island in the Amur River, opened fire with machine guns on Soviet river-transport workers who had come to the island to repair navigation markers, as has been their practice. The attackers also used grenade launchers and hand grenades.

As a result of this violent attack on unarmed Soviet river-transport workers performing official duties, one was killed and three were wounded. The river-transport launches 'Thrush' and 'Black Duck' were seriously damaged.²⁷

The final "serious" boundary exchange during 1969 occurred at nearly the opposite end of the Sino-Soviet border, thousands of miles distant, in the Tiehliekti area in Yumin County of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China. Russian reports of the clash were comparatively understated and appeared to dwell more on the context of Russian-Chinese relations, than on the event itself.²⁸ The Chinese, however, in their official note to the Soviet Embassy in Peking, accused the Soviet side of "intruding two kilometers" into the Tiehliekti area, mounting a sudden attack on Chinese frontier guards, killing and wounding "many of the Chinese frontier guards." The Chinese charged that the Russians sent two helicopters, "dozens of tanks and armoured vehicles" and "several hundred troops." It was only after many hours and the withdrawal by the Chinese deeper into their own territory that the Russians apparently broke off the action.²⁹

ANALYSIS OF THE BORDER CONTROVERSY

Review of the exchanges and maneuverings of the Chinese and the Russians over the last ten years, the time frame encompassing their contemporary border controversy, reveals the following: (1) With few exceptions, it has been the Chinese who have initiated (and sometimes "provoked") the dialog, the polemics, and the military clashes; (2) Territorial claims are singularly unilateral, with the Chinese evoking memories of "unequal treaties" and intimating some future claim to be pressed for a debt unpaid; (3) The Russians stand

foresquare for the status quo, rejecting the PRC thesis that land that was once Chinese is always Chinese, and while agreeing to minor "adjustments," refuse to accept the irredentist claims of their southern neighbors;³⁰ (4) Border controversy appears to be more a symptom of the wider Sino-Soviet pathology than an actual cause;³¹ (5) Each protagonist genuinely fears the other -- the Russians concerned about a resurrection of the "Yellow Peril" and the growing menace of more than 800 million Chinese armed with nuclear weapons, and possibly backed up by American imperialists; the Chinese almost hysterically fearful of a Russian preemptive nuclear strike, supported by the most mobile and modern army in that part of the world, if not the entire world; and (6) the border talks are where they began in 1964, singularly lacking in success.³²

The tempo of Sino-Soviet border relations is relatively quiescent as 1973 draws to an end. There have been no real confrontations since late '69³³ and while unable to report progress, the talks at least have not been abandoned. It is in the broader sense that Russian-Chinese relations appear tenuous and provocative.

Militarily the two nations have never been more mutually threatening. Best, current Western estimates credit the Russians with at least 45 divisions along the 4,000-mile-long common border, one-fourth of their tactical and long-range aircraft, with "a large number of Scaleboard, Frog-7 and Scud tactical missile battalions along the border."

It is also reported as many as 12 divisions may be held in reserve, capable of rapid reinforcement at several significant points. Matching this, the Chinese numbers appear to equal or approach those of the Russians, with a growing nuclear capability which recent data enumerate as about "50 medium and 15-20 IRBM nuclear missiles at four locations."³⁴ (See Institute for Strategic Studies map, page 48,) an excellent document despite the dated strength enumerations.)

Commenting upon Sino-Soviet military moves which appear directed at each other, the Military Correspondent for the New York Times has recently pointed out:

The recent military redeployments and weapons tests suggest to some officials that China is actively preparing to employ nuclear weapons in hopes such activity might increase its deterrent strength vis a vis the Russians. And, if forced to use such weapons, China apparently wants to be able to hold major Russian troop concentrations in sparsely settled border areas, to limit nuclear fallout and other collateral damage to Chinese cities in the interior.³⁵

It is generally thought that Soviet strategy toward the Chinese in the seventies will be "tough and aggressive" on all levels, with the only compromise coming from the Chinese. A large-scale attack by the Soviets to cancel out China's nuclear facilities (within easy range of the 500-mile reach of, for example, the Scaleboard) is definitely possible. Some would say, probable.³⁶

Both sides in the Sino-Soviet scenario are taking seriously the possible option of active military action. Reports from various sources are that the Kremlin has recently concluded an in-depth review of the alternatives available

in its quarrel with the Chinese and consider them narrowing down to two broad choices: "do nothing" while the menace of China grows by "leaps and bounds," or unleash a "surgical strike" that would both check Chinese nuclear advances for at least ten years and would probably cause the overthrow of the present "pragmatically oriented" government of Mao and Chou. It would seem that the period of maximum danger to the Chinese is in the next fifteen or so months. Chinese strategy is obvious - - enhance and expand conventional and nuclear postures as rapidly as possible (the Russians accused the Chinese of spending an unprecedented \$8 to \$9 billions on defense in the past year, an amount roughly equal to almost 10% of the PRC GNP, or equivalent to a US budget of nearly \$120 billions!), do all China can to keep the NATO pact and members "in there" against the Russians (as holding a coat, or something) as a means of diverting and tying down Russian armies on her western front, and to develop the strongest economic and, yes, military ties possible with the United States.³⁷

The danger of war between Russia and China is great and it is almost permanent in terms of this century. The USSR will probably have to decide several times a year in the coming two or three years whether or not they should make the big move against China. Conversely, the dangers and risks of war are so enormous, the consequences so very painful and vivid (the USSR experienced nearly 22 million deaths in World War II, and she has never forgotten it), it

may be possible to avoid it. Militating against this, however, is the unfortunate fact that neither side is optimally equipped to solve the equation at a level below violence. The Maoists aren't certain they want to deal with the border friction; the Russians have only one policy there, to hold on to what they have by force.³⁸

CONCLUSIONS

Following his trips to Peking and Moscow in 1972, the President in a speech to Congress spoke of the reduction in hostile confrontation/ⁱⁿ which "for decades America has been locked with the two great Communist powers." And while such guarded optimism is no cause for great euphoria, when it is combined with the corresponding increase in Sino-Soviet rivalry the ramifications for American foreign policy should be considered.

There is ample evidence that after a cold war of more than ten years, both China and Russia consider the other its principal enemy. This would seem to suggest that the incentive both Russia and China have to achieve a modus vivendi with the United States is a powerful one, and one we should examine. Intervening in this equation is the life span of the present Chinese regime (Chinese, rather than Soviet, because it is older in terms of its two leaders, Mao and Chou, and because it is the Chinese who resist amelioration). With the instability of the PRC these past years, the deaths of either or both Chou and Mao could unbalance the present

Far Eastern power relationships.³⁹ State interests do survive leaders' deaths, and China has had an increasingly viable foreign policy that has perceptibly moved her into the world community from her previous self-imposed isolation.

Ultimately, the Sino-Soviet dispute is a mixed bag. It is, of course, titillating in its promise that the two giants will bludgeon each other to death, leaving the field to the "good guys!" And at the very least, the dispute should divide and vitiate our communist competitors, thereby strengthening our side. Yet this may be simplistic, for inevitably disputes between great powers contribute to the world's disunity and problems as smaller and adjacent nations are drawn into camps and spheres of power politics. Not only that, it is difficult to believe that any war between nuclear powers would be fought conventionally. Nuclear warfare would, in turn, reach out and drag countries such as Japan and India and other neighboring powers into its grasp, ultimately enmeshing most of the globe.


It is, then, that the implications for American foreign policy inherent in the border rivalry must be approached with caution. Certainly, the conflict for both China and the Soviets is a calamity of the first order. The secure borders the Russians once enjoyed in the east have been replaced by a menace far greater than the West ever seemed. Peking, for her part, possesses an almost pathological fear of her northern neighbor and finds herself impelled to the expenditure of much national treasure she can ill afford. Yet because of an attitude toward Russia that combines e-

qual parts of fear, belligerence, and competitiveness, China frantically rushes forward seeking some kind of nuclear parity with the Russians and continues to maintain a vast border army.⁴⁰

In seeking to optimize opportunities created by the border confrontation, the United States should recognize neither of the principals can be manipulated at will. There are differences between the US and China and differences between the US and the USSR which are not easily reconciled.⁴¹ And if accommodation could be achieved over such apparently "hard" matters as European hegemony and Taiwan, to mention but two, there would still be the diametrically opposite ideological and economic positions remaining. Notwithstanding, this nation has already moved toward maximizing the opportunities suggested by the Sino-Soviet schism. The increasing contacts with China as we incline to de jure recognition, our tacit acceptance of her admission to the United Nations, the Nixon and Kissinger visits to Peking, the ending of the Viet Nam war---all serve to strengthen the Chinese in their standoff with the Soviets. While with the Russians we have concluded far-reaching military and trade agreements which certify to the balance we have determined to maintain.

We are clearly entering an era of transition and, hopefully, mutual accommodation leading toward more amicable relationships with both China and the USSR. This is not to ignore the competitive dimensions of any East-West association, nor can we overlook a State Department analysis

which forecasts a continuing decline in power for both the United States and the Soviet Union, with a corresponding rise in Chinese influence and significance. What we can do is to continue a posture of negotiation, of wider and more concerted contacts, avoiding clumsy or naive manipulation, but seeking positively to build up and support critical and pivotal regions of the earth. Perhaps by avoiding the temptation to become involved in local crises and "proxy" confrontations with China and Russia we will accomplish more. Perhaps tacit agreement can be reached that will set perimeters to our rivalry and result in certain regions becoming "off limits" to great power competition. And perhaps by this approach we will come to the understanding that as interaction among and between nations increases, so does the complexity of the relationship and with it the chance for failure or success.


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FOOTNOTES

1. Various individuals have been credited with first breaking the story that the Russians were contemplating a "surgical nuclear strike," or war against the Chinese. Jack Anderson, writer, in June of 1969; CIA Director Richard Helms and Secretary of State William P. Rogers, both in August of the same year; Neville Maxwell, London Times newsman, in February of 1970. Most recently, US News and World Report ("Russia vs. China in Big War?" 27 August 1973, pp 32-33) asserts Henry Kissinger warned European leaders of a possible Soviet move against China.

2. Speaking before the recent 10th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Peking, Premier Chou En-lai stated, "(China must be on its guard)...against surprise attack on our country by Soviet revisionist social imperialism. They want to devour China but find it too tough to bite."

3. Tai Sung-An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, pp. 1-57. See also LTC Richard A. Kupau, Sino-Soviet Border Controversy: Political and Military Implications for US Foreign Policy, pp. 1-32.

4. Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, and Francis Watson, The Frontiers of China, p. 13.

5. It is the official position of the Soviet government that their borders have evolved historically and are subject only to "clarifications," not wholesale revision. See, for example, G. Apalin, "Attack on New Chinese World Atlas," The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 6 September 1972, pp. 1-4.

6. Doolin.

7. Edmund O. Clubb, "Armed Conflict in the Chinese Border Lands, 1917-1950," in Sino-Soviet Military Relations, ed. by Raymond L. Garthoff, pp. 9-43.

8. John Gittings, The Sino-Soviet Dispute, 1956-1963.

9. COL O. Ferdinand Miksche, "Sino-Soviet War in 19xx?", in Garthoff, pp. 193-202.

10. Stefan T. Possony, "Peking and Moscow: The Permanence of Conflict," Modern Age, Spring 1972, pp. 130-145.

11. Harrison Salisbury, War Between Russia and China.

12. Sung-an, p. 156.
13. First published in 1954 and relegated to Chinese history books, the map was distributed as a weapon in the Chinese-Russian psywar at the Chinese Trade Fair in Mexico City during December and January of 1963 and 1964.
14. Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I, pp. 33-35; Chiang Kai-shek, China's Destiny, p. 242; and Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 96.
15. Tien-fong Cheng, A History of Sino-Russian Relations, p. 110.
16. Soviet News, 21 September 1963, cited by Gittings, pp. 67-68.
17. "Greatest Splitters of Our Time," Peking Review, 7 February 1964, p. 1.
18. "Mao Tse-tung a Hitler," Tass International Service, 19 September 1964.
19. Interview with Chinese officials appearing in Le Monde, 22 March 1966, cited in Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, April-June, 1966, p. 217.
20. "Growing Distrust of China," Los Angeles Times, 23 November 1967, p. 21.
21. James H. Buck, LTC (Ret), "National Objectives of the People's Republic of China," Military Review, December, 1972, pp. 25-37.
22. In the Chinese language the island is Chenpao, or "treasure." It is about 300 km southwest of Khabarovsk.
23. Precise casualty figures are not available. CDSP, Volume 21, Nos. 10-13, 12 March - 16 April 1969, and the Peking Review for 21 March 1969, provide extensive information (The PR has devoted 21 pages of maps, photographs and lurid "evidence" to the clash.), but all somewhat contradictory. The Strategic Survey 1969 records Russian losses as 31 KIA and 14 WIA. Chinese losses are not recorded, but may have reached 100 KIA and WIA. (See SS-'69, pp. 66-72.)
24. Yevtushenko has apparently extricated himself from his 1962 difficulties when his poem "Babi Yar" was criticized for implying that the Soviet regime was guilty of anti-Semitism. His visit some months ago to the United States was characterized by "spontaneous" poetic indictments of US "racism" and the war in Viet Nam.

25. The New York Times commented upon a Chinese film, "Anti-Chinese Atrocities of the New Tsars," in May, which related to the island attacks, and the PRC Foreign Ministry issued an official denunciation of the USSR over Damansky on 24 May 1973. Russian reaction was carried by TASS, Pravda, Moscow Radio, and in an official note to the Chinese. See particularly CDSP, Volume 21, No. 11, 2 April 1969, pp. 3-6.

26. "Soviet Frontier Troops Flagrantly Intrude Into China's Territory," Peking Review, 11 July 1969, pp. 6-7.

27. "Note from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Chinese People's Republic's Embassy in Moscow," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXI, No. 28, 6 August 1969, p. 34.

28. "Events in China," CDSP, Vol. XXI, No. 34, 17 September 1969, pp. 16-17.

29. "Soviet Troops Flagrantly Intrude Into China's Tieh-liekti Area in Creating Incident of Bloodshed," Peking Review, Volume 33, 15 August 1969, pp. 3 and 7.

30. As reported in the Soviet News, 21 September 1963: 'If countries begin making territorial claims on one another, using as arguments certain ancient data and the graves of their forefathers, if they start fighting to revise the historically developed frontiers, this will lead to no good.'

31. Peter S. H. Tang, "Sino-Soviet Dispute," Russian Review, Vol. 28, No. 4, October 1969, pp. 403-415.

32. When China agreed to reopen border talks at the unlikely location of the Peking Airport, in a meeting between Kosygin and Chou in late 1969, it portended progress toward settlement. The Russians had given the Chinese a bloody nose in the second Damansky Island fracas earlier that year, and had demonstrated a willingness to escalate the conflict even more when they used 'dozens of tanks' in Yumin, Sinkiang five months later. Perhaps, most significantly, it was at this juncture reports of a possible Soviet "surgical strike" against the Chinese were being widely circulated. The momentum of these events seemed sufficient to soften earlier PRC resistance to meaningful negotiations, but such proved to be not the case.

33. The Dzungarian Gate "Bandit" incident in November of 1972 appears to have been just that, an isolated episode which neither side wanted to expand upon.

34. The Military Balance, 1973-1974 places 45 Russian divisions, including two in Mongolia, along the border. Eight divisions are tank, and the ground elements are supported by

one-fourth of the Russian Air Force. Chinese forces consist of 45 divisions and as many as six border divisions in the Shenyang and Perking Military Regions (Amur-Ussuri area), with 15 divisions in the Lanchow MR (adjacent to Mongolia), and perhaps 10 divisions in Sinkiang (this extrapolated from a combined figure which includes Chengtu and Kinming MR's). Additionally, Military Balance, 1973-1974 credits the PRC with 50 medium and 15-20 IRBM's. (See pp. 6 and 46). A second source, Proceedings, the monthly magazine of the US Naval Institute (in an article, "Russian Sea Power Could Destroy the Sino-Soviet Balance," by Foreign Service Officer J.K. Holloway, Jr, Los Angeles Times, 16 September 1973, p. 3) carries Chinese border strength as 'at least 1/2 a million,' and refers to 'American experts' who say Russian strength has gone from 15 divisions in 1961, to 33 in 1971, to the present all-time high of 49. Holloway adds, 'some estimates of the total number of troops (on both sides) reach 2,000,000.' William Beecher, "China Looks North," Sea Power, September 1972, pp. 22-26, carries Russian border strength as 'at least 45 divisions, representing one-quarter of its army,' with some contentions another 12 divisions, at partial strength are in nearby reserve. Beecher emphasizes the PRC's growing nuclear posture and her ability to mass produce a tactical fighter-bomber, the F-9.

35. Beecher, pp. 22-26.

36. Donald L. Clark, LTC (USAF), "Soviet Strategy for the Seventies," Air University Review, January-February, 1971, Vol. XXII, No. 2, pp. 2-18.

37. Joseph Fromm, "Russia vs. China in Big War?", US News and World Report, 27 August 1973, pp 32-33.

38. Possony, pp. 130-145.

39. Not an altogether impossible circumstance. The full story of Lin Piao is yet to be revealed, but it would appear he was seeking to overthrow the government in September of 1971 when discovered and forced to flee, only to die as his Trident aircraft crashed and burned after possibly being shot down by pursuing PRC fighter aircraft. A recent dispatch out of Hong Kong by a scholarly China-watcher, Robert S. Elegant, (Los Angeles Times, 5 November 1973, pp. 12,13) tells of a new 'spectacular' out of China in which 'extremists leftists in Peking and elsewhere in China are trying to stir up a mass revolt...against the Party and the people's government.' He adds, 'Chiang Ching (Mme. Mao) is leader the the extremists and she commands the enormous prestige of her husband's name.'

40. Thomas W. Robinson, "View From Peking: China's Policies Toward the US, the Soviet Union, and Japan," Pacific Affairs, No. 45, Fall 1972, pp. 333-355.

41. Taiwan is a volatile and highly emotional issue with the Chinese and although they are apparently willing to relegate Taiwan to the sidelines for the present, it is merely 'on ice' and will assuredly return so long as both we and they maintain present stands. An interesting discussion of this is found in an article by Gerald Morgen, "Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," Contemporary Review, No. 216, May 1970, pp. 231-235. Also see "Sino-Soviet Dispute," Russian Review, No. 32, April 1973, pp. 189-192.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 1
CHRONOLOGY OF CHINESE-RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL EXCHANGES
1647-1949*

The Year	Event and Results
1647	Cossacks penetrate to Amur River seeking trade and territory.
1652	BATTLE OF ANCHANSKY GOROD. At mouth of Ussuri River, Cossacks relinquish fort in first Chinese-Russian military engagement.
1683-1689	TREATY OF NERCHINSK. Following Chinese-Russian clash, agreement reached. First treaty between China and European state. Checked Russian expansion to East. A gain for China.
1727	TREATY OF KIAKHTA. China loses territory between upper Irtysh and Saian mountains; territory south of Lake Baikal. Loss for China.
1842	TREATY OF NANKING. Following Opium War. Exposed Chinese weakness, encouraging Russian expansion. Prelude to 1864 losses. Immediate loss to China.
1847-1849	Russia violates Treaty of Nerchinsk and establishes trading post at mouth of Amur River. Loss to China.
1850-1864	Taiping Rebellion. Russia joins US and European Powers in wresting concessions from China. Colonists and troops sent down Amur by Russia. Sakhalin Island illegally occupied. Chinese loss.
1858	TREATY OF AIGUN. Forced upon Chinese. Ceded all land east of Ussuri to Russia (in joint condominium with China) and all land north of Amur River. Chinese loss.
1858	TREATY OF TIENTSIN. Gave Russia trade in seven Chinese ports, other "most-favored-nation" treatment. Loss to China.
1860	TREATY OF PEKING. Nullified Treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta. Defines new border as west of Amur, confirms earlier claim. Loss to China of 133,000 square miles.

TABLE 1 - Continued

The Year	Event and Results
1864	TREATY OF TARBAGATAI. Termed "Treaty of Chuguchak" by Chinese. Vast lands lost to Russia, including areas south of Semipalatinsk, southeast of Lake Zaisan, and north of Lake Issyk-kul in "Great North-West." Chinese loss.
1871	Russ occupies lands in Sinkiang near Lake Balkhash in Chinese loss.
1878	TREATY OF LIVADIA. Ostensibly a Chinese gain in the return of Ili region. Actual loss to China and gain to Russia of southwestern Ili, trade and diplomatic concessions, cash indemnity.
1881	TREATY OF ST. PETERSBURG. Southern Sinkiang and Tekes Valley and Ili pass to China. A rare gain for China as Russia gives up territory.
1895	TREATY OF PAMIR. China not signatory, but loses land. Russia and England divide Pamir plateau.
1911- 1912	REPUBLIC OF CHINA established, Ch'ing Dynasty overthrown. New governments demands end of "unequal" treaties, return to "traditional" boundaries.
1917	Soviet regime established. Karakhan Proclamation promising return to China of all Tsarist Russian lands once Chinese, repudiation of all "unequal" Russian-Chinese treaties. Ostensible gain, but actually no change as result of USSR failure to implement.
1921- 1924	Russian-Chinese protocol resulting in establishment of Mongolian People's Republic. Practical results: separation of Mongolia from China, economic and political penetration by USSR. China gains with Russ surrender of extraterritoriality in China.
1922	Tannu Tuva (Uriankhai) occupied by USSR. Loss to China.
1923	SUN-JOFFE DECLARATION. USSR and Chinese Republic come to agreement on China's right to continue as republican nation. Beginning of assertive posture of over broad land claims based upon "unequal treaties." This Chinese Republican Government Period (actually began in 1911) marked one band of common agreement among Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek,

TABLE 1 - Continued

The Year	Event and Results
	Mao-Tse-tung all echo territorial claims, abrogation of "unequal treaties" through 1949.
1944	Uriankhai annexed by Russ in formalizing earlier 1922 occupation. Chinese loss.
1946-1949	"East Turkestan People's Republic" (in Ili) proclaimed by anti-Chinese Moslem insurgents with Soviet backing. Returned to China in 1949.

*The chronology for Table 1 was developed from those works cited in the "Selected Bibliography," with emphasis on Bray, Doolin, Gerthoff, Rupen, Ronchey, Schwartz, Sung-an, Tai, and Tang.

TABLE 2

CALENDAR OF SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL EXCHANGES

1950-1968*

The Date	Nature of Exchange
1950	SINO-SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP. Beginning of Sino-Soviet modern, "Comrades-in-arms" era. Commercial and land gains for Russia. Bases at Port Arthur and Dairen for Russ. Chinese loss.
1954	"Russia refused to discuss Mongolia independence." (Revealed 10 years later by Mao Tse-tung in Peking, July 1964.)
1957	"Russia refused to discuss territorial issues." (Chou En-lai, Peking, 1964.)
1958	TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION. USSR and PRC mutually accept territorial status of other.
1959	First Sino-Soviet border skirmishes occur in Tien Shan mountains bordering Kirgiziya. Reported by <u>Pravda</u> in series written by Konstantin Simonov.
1962	Chinese provoke and initiate contemporary Sino-Soviet territorial dispute by harsh criticisms of Soviet "adventurism" and "timidity" through the installation and subsequent removal (under US threat) of IRBM's on Cuba. Khrushchev responds with insult to China over Macao and Hong Kong being in hands of colonialists.
1963	
(MAR)	China points out that Hong Kong and Macao are the results of "unequal treaties," and asks if Russia wishes to raise the question "of all unequal treaties and have a general settlement?" (PR, 15 March 1963)
(SEP)	Russ accuse China of "5,000 border violations in 1962, alone." In subsequent statements, charges Chinese persecution of minorities, systematic border violations, machine gun fire against residents of Ili-Kazakh Province.
(OCT)	China states USSR started trouble in Sinkiang. Russ charge Chinese with "hypocrisy" in border matters.

TABLE 2 - Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
(DEC)	Premier Khrushchev addressing USSR Council of Ministers asserts need to settle territorial questions, but reaffirms Russian stance that historical claims are not valid approach to problem.
1964	
(JAN)	-Edgar Snow reveals interview with Chou En-lai in which Chinese leader says border talks with Russ to begin. -Russ complain Chinese not telling "Soviet side" in dispute.
(FEB)	-Chinese accuse Russ of provoking Sinkiang subversion. -Russ reply Chinese cause trouble. -Russ border delegation arrives in Peking.
(APR)	-USSR indicts China for "repression of Sinkiang minorities." -China accuses Russ "in past few years...carried out large-scale subversion against Sinkiang, enticed and coerced tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going to the Soviet Union, and created trouble on the border." (New China News Agency, 28 April 1964)
(JUL)	-Mao's charge that Russia refused to discuss border in 1954 made. -"USSR holds large territories of others," states Chou En-lai while visiting Japanese Socialist Diet member. (19 July 1964)
(AUG)	- <u>Izvestia</u> editor states Russia's borders are inviolable, sacred. -Russian borders are "fixed by life, itself," according to <u>Tass</u> , and not subject to political deals.
(SEP)	-Responding to Mao's July accusation, USSR replies that territorial dispute is "complicated" and nothing is to be gained from "military adventures and aggression." -USSR terms Chinese territorial claims "rabid nationalism." -China refers to "Khrushchev revisionists constantly creating border incidents." (PR, 11 September '64)

TABLE 2 - Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
	-Chinese emperors waged wars of aggrandizement. Mao Tse-tung's plaint over "living space" for China likened to Hitler's ravings. (<u>Tass</u> , 19 September 1964, quoting Khrushchev.)
(NOV)	-Khrushchev's fall from power linked to his engineering of border disputes between USSR and PRC, subversive activities in Sinkiang. (PR 27 Nov 1964)
1965	
(SEP)	-"Renegades from communism and lackeys of imperialism are carrying out constant subversion and sabotage activities (in Sinkiang...) "The Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region is a fortified frontier and a great wall in defense of our motherland." (Peking Review, 8 October 1965)
(NOV)	- <u>Pravda</u> enjoins China to end polemics over border. Adds, "(The USSR) has done everything to ensure normalization of relations between the USSR and China."
1966	
(MAR)	-China claims Russ refuse to negotiate frontier in Far East.
(APR)	-Chinese publish new "Regulations Concerning Navigation" in border waters of Amur and Ussuri Rivers. Aimed at one country, USSR, and, if applied would severely restrict Russ use of waters.
(NOV)	-Soviets allege Chinese press keeps "harping on the subject of tension on the border." (<u>Die Welt</u> (Berling), 21 March 1966)
1967	
(JUL)	-Russ accused of destroying Chinese patrol route in Sinkiang.
(SEP)	-Russ complain Chinese tried to expand subject of navigational talks to deal with boundary matters.
(OCT)	-Chinese territorial claims would strip territory from newly independent countries, say Russ.

TABLE 2 - Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
(DEC)	-Russ report Chinese-instigated incidents along Amar-Ussuri frontier.
1968	
(JAN)	-Additional Soviet charges of Chinese-caused river episodes.
(AUG)	-Chinese label Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation in Siberian oil development as "filthy conspiracy" to encircle China. -Soviet-sponsored invasion of Czechoslovakia under cloak of "Brezhnev Doctrine" creates havoc in PRC leading to reports of increased Chinese troop deployment along Sino-Soviet border.

*Entries for Table 2 drawn largely from Current Digest of Soviet Press, the Peking Review, and other periodical literature.

TABLE 3

CALENDAR OF SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL EXCHANGES

1969-1973*

The Date	Nature of Exchange
1969	
(MAR)	-Damansky Island Clashes with Russ-Chinese units up to regiment in size, supported by artillery and tanks. (See pages 9-11, this paper. Also see map, page 48.)
(APR)	-Dzungarian Gate Clashes, Sinkiang. (See map.) -Russia proposes renewed border talks.
(MAY)	-China accepts border talk offer, blames Russ for delay. Seven border clashes reported in May. (See map.)
(JUN)	-China accuses USSR in Sinkiang border fight. (See map.) -Russ again asks border talks. Pleads, "Stop quarrel."
(JUL)	- <u>NY Times</u> reports "War imminent between PRC and USSR." -Pacha (Goldinsky) Island Clash on Amur-Ussuri sector. (See map.)(See page 12, this report.) -Russ charge China with "100 incidents in 1969."
(AUG)	-Russ and Chinese sign River Navigation Pact for Amur-Ussuri. -Yumin, Sinkiang, clash. (See map and page 13, this report.) -China accuses Russia of "429 military acts along border in June and July alone." -CIA Director warns of possible Soviet attack on PRC. -US Secretary of State reported as worried over possible Russ-China nuclear war. -Soviets charge "32,000 non-Chinese held in Sinkiang concentration camps in the Taklamakan Desert."
(SEP)	-Indian Ambassador to US states China moved her nuclear facilities from Lop Nor (Sinkiang) to a "safer place." -Chou En-lai and Kosygin Peking Airport meet and agree renew border talks. -International Institute for Strategic Studies reports increase in Russ-Chinese border strengths.

TABLE 3 - Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
(OCT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -China announces border talks with USSR to begin. -V.V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, USSR, meets with Deputy Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chia Kuan-hua, PRC in Peking to begin border talks and "questions of interest." -World press states talks are a victory for the Russians and a move toward conciliation by the PRC as result of "Chinese fear of Russ military strength."
(NOV)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -New Russian military command in Central Asia Military District with headquarters at Alma Ata seen as reducing Soviet reaction time by vesting more authority in local command. -Russ report "talks deadlocked" but continuing.
(DEC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -"USSR has curtailed aid to developing countries because so much money is being spent on China border fortifications," according to Professor Tulpanov of Free University of Berlin. -Hong Kong paper reports Chinese troops surrounded Russian regiment in Sinkiang and asked apology for their intrusion. No subsequent confirmation. -USSR writer, A. Amalrick advances theme: "War Between China and USSR sometime in 1975-1980." -Talks on border lack progress. Chinese want Soviets to "admit unequal treaties." -Reports of Chinese air raid shelters and war preparations in large cities. -Salisbury's book, "War Between Russia and China" gets big reaction within and outside communist world.
1970	
(JAN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Chief Russian Border Negotiator, Kuznetsov returns to Peking after Moscow where he is thought to have reported no progress. -China criticizes Russ on border talks. Says "USSR talks peace, plans war." -Chinese-American talks linked to border stalemate. Chinese thought less likely to make concessions with opening of bridges to US and corresponding upgrading of political strength.

TABLE 3 - Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
(FEB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -<u>London Times</u> declares, "China faces real and deadly threat from USSR." -<u>Pravda</u> labels Salisbury's book as something "turned in one setting" and "false history" aimed at "nationalistic" Chinese.
(MAR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -China asks both sides to withdraw troops from borders so real talks can begin. -USSR publicly reassures PRC "no attack" is planned on Chinese. -Salisbury newspaper story tells of "50,000-man liberation army led by General Z. Taibor in Alma Ata Kazankstan with open Soviet support...for freeing Sinkiang." -China warned against "bellicose pressure tactics aimed at obtaining concessions in border talks." (<u>Pravda</u>, 20 March)
(APR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -China charged by USSR with "open provocation" in her military preparations along border. -Both Russia and China increase border strength, but preemptive Russ nuclear strike now doubted. (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.) -All historic Manchuria area along border placed under unified military command by PRC. -Russian Party Paper calls Chinese "militarily hysterical."
(MAY)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -<u>Pravda</u> editorial accuses China of unfounded territorial claims, provoking conflict.
(JUN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -"No appreciable progress has been made in border talks...there is a general anti-Soviet course being followed by Chinese officials...but the USSR will continue the talks nonetheless." Premier Alexi Kosygen.
(JUL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Western analysts report hundreds of USSR tactical nuclear weapons are along Chinese border with new solid fuel mobile missiles (as "Scaleboard"), and a build-up of 35 combat-ready divisions. China said to have reinforced border guards in Mongolia region, to be building up para-military forces elsewhere along border points. -16th regular meeting for River Navigation held between Russ and Chinese in Feiho, PRC.

TABLE 3 - Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
(AUG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -USSR announces plans for farm settlements on Ussuri-Amur river islands. Considered provocation even if not on disputed islands (600 of 700 are disputed). -<u>Deputy</u> Minister Ilyichev replaces Kuznetsov amid reports of slight border concessions by Russians to Chinese if latter renounce historic claims to large areas of Soviet Far East and Central Asia. China reported to continue pushing for mutual force pull-back.
(SEP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Institute for Strategic Studies announces USSR has added nine divisions in 1969 for a total of 47 along Sino-Soviet border giving Russians complete superiority in both weapons and materiel. -<u>Izvestia</u> story states, "Local Amur trade accord signed." Seen as relaxation of tensions.
(OCT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Rumors of large USSR military maneuvers in the Maritime Provinces.
(NOV)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Party Politburo Member, M.A. Suslov, says talks on border continue, but no hint of progress. -<u>Pravda</u> covers Soviet Navy Day with strong implications that China is virtually defenseless and open to assault and invasion from the sea "at any Chinese port." -Radio Liberty says weakness of Chinese navy stressed on Soviet Navy Day.
(DEC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Russ announce signing of annual accord with China on water navigation along eastern border. -China denies border navigation accord signed, but says agreement for a 17th meeting was reached.
1971	
(JAN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Although propaganda continues on both sides, negotiations move on. Situation is considered stabilized in story from <u>Pravda</u>.
(MAR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The <u>New York Times</u> notes absence of border news and editorially asks (March 15th edition), "Have talks broken off? Have there been new, unreported border clashes?"

TABLE 3 - Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
(MAY)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -USSR accused of preparing for war and having over "one million troops along our border" by Chou-En-lai. Premier adds his hopes for "improving relations." -Tass notes talks are moving slowly but apparently amicably. Nineteen members of border talk team tour Nanking, Shanghai and Hanchow with Ilyichev and are accompanied by Chinese Negotiator, Chai Chen-wen.
(JUN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Chou En-lai in talks with western visitors explains massive air shelter program throughout China as safeguard against Soviet nuclear attack, "spurred by the 1969 clashes and making necessary the storage of large reserves of grain in rural communes, along with other measures."
(AUG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -In a James Reston (<u>LA Times</u>) of Chou in Peking, readers learn of massive Russian military build-up along China's border, and of the possibility of a Soviet attack on China, of China's preparedness and her absence of fear. -S.L. Tikhvinsky (termed by <u>Pravda</u> as leading expert on China and early, former member of border talk team) accuses Chinese leaders of fabricating concern over possible Russian invasion in order to justify their anti-Soviet line, to improve relations with West. -<u>Izvestia</u> charges China has rejected "constructive proposals" by Moscow in twenty-two months of talks, and that settlement would tie China's hands in playing on international differences.
(SEP)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -China reported by Russ to be "militarizing all aspects of life in China in preparation for war." -<u>New York Times</u> reports rumors of talk break-down, tensions up, possible new border fights.
(OCT)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Chou En-lai criticizes stationing of Soviet troops along China border. Says China's policy is to negotiate.
(DEC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -USSR-PRC Cold War rhetoric at United Nations (PRC admitted 27 October 1971) linked to border dispute and China's fear of USSR.

TABLE 3 - Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
1972	
(FEB)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -<u>Krasnaya Zvezda</u> (Soviet Armed Forces Publication) charges the modernization of China's nuclear and conventional weapons are directed mainly at the Soviet Union. -USSR Defense Ministry states the defense budget of the People's Republic of China is at a record \$8.5 billions and that Western nations are supplying China with strategic weapons "to include nuclear materials." -Noted scholar, A.S. Whiting says China's fear of Russia stems from 1969 clashes.
(MAR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Borders talks resumed on 20 March.
(APR)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Special news feature and pictures covering Soviet border guards carried by <u>Tass</u> and <u>Pravda</u>. Sergeants S. Gorbach and Kasyan from Pacific Ocean Red Banner Border District highlighted.
(MAY)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Soviet border delegation visits Canton Trade Fair, lay wreaths at Soviet memorials in Wuhan and Canton. No progress reported. -USSR rocket specialist on Chinese border, General V.F. Tolubko, recalled to Moscow to take charge of all Strategic Missile Forces, made a deputy defense chief. Viewed as decline in Sino-Soviet tensions.
(JUN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Leonid Brezhnev at the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions alludes to the need for "respect for Soviet borders and their inviolability."
(JUL)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -US military analysts link China's reluctance to permit Soviet military cargo cross China (for North Viet Nam) to Peking's apprehension over continued Soviet border build-up. -A.E. Cherny, Siberian Regional official, calls on China to renew good-neighborliness. Border between Khabarovsk and Manchuria across the Amur virtually sealed. -<u>NY Times</u> quotes US Military analysts saying China rapidly building arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, special aircraft to deter USSR. Also basic shift in Chinese military strategy with China moving 1st line Army divisions and air squadrons into forward positions, abandoning defense concept of reliance on paramilitary and

TABLE 3 - Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
	and drawing attacking Soviets deep into China.
(AUG)	- <u>Izvestia</u> scores new China Atlas of World as "absurd demand for 600,000 square miles of Russian territory." Indicative of border talk deadlock.
(SEP)	-Brezhnev tours near China border and meets with commander of Siberian Military District. Public indicator of significance of region, mission. -US Government reports three mechanized divisions join 46 known divisions along Sino-Soviet border with nearly 1/3 of Russian ground forces now in the east. Considered permanent deployment.
(OCT)	-Western journalists touring Peking bomb-shelter complex, told China has early-warning system, that bulk of big city population can be underground in minutes. Tied in with border threat.
(NOV)	- <u>Izvestia</u> publishes two-volume documentation of first boundary pact between Russia and China in 1689 (Treaty of Nerchinsk), in "Russian-Chinese Relations in the 17th Century." Article pointedly cites this as "proof of the unlawfulness of the Ching government's claim to the Amur region," and adds this "confirms the correctness of the historical facts certain circles would like to distort." -In first report of border fighting since late '69, five Soviet soldiers and several shepherds were reported killed near the historic Dzungarian Gate, scene of the April 1969 fights, and a natural mountain pass joining the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan and the Chinese Region of Sinkiang. One captured Chinese was labeled as "bandit" by the PRC officials who disowned him. Diplomatic sources cautioned against exaggerating the incident, emphasize Chinese insistence "bandits" were at fault.
(DEC)	-Foreign Ministry spokesman for PRC brands USSR reports of Dzungarian Gate episode as "sheer fabrication and malicious slander." USSR Foreign Minister declines comment, hints at "confidential" story in hands of Russ journalists. -On occasion of 50th Anniversary of USSR, Chairman Brezhnev rebuts Chinese charges of Soviet aggression, says China wants improved relations with PRC,

TABLE 3 - Continued

The Date

Nature of Exchange

but gives no indication of broader progress. Adds that China will not agree to outlaw force in Sino-Soviet relations.

-LA Times writer, Joseph Harsch, reports Russ have shifted military buildup from Sinkiang to Maritime Provinces over past year. This shift is viewed as one designed to improve Russian defense posture in that region, compared with the earlier offense-oriented moves near Sinkiang.

1973

(JAN)

-Indian diplomat connects upswing in Russo-Indian friendship to Sino-Soviet border problems. Explains this as Russian effort to appear "reasonable," gain mileage in psy-war with Chinese.
-Russians publish new names for nine Far Eastern Siberian towns in change from "Chinese-sounding" to Russian terms.
-Joseph Alsop reports China is "briskly" moving to deploy a first group of about ten nuclear missiles with sufficient range to reach Moscow, Leningrad and other Soviet heartland targets. Launch sites are unique in that they are being carved into sides of mountains. (Earlier deployment estimated at some 50 "soft" sites.)
-Second Alsop story reports that first overture to China from US came from Nixon "beyond doubt" after the President violently rejected the 1969 Soviet request for tacit US approval of immediate Russ military action against the PRC.

(FEB)

-Word of Russian overflights along the Sino-Soviet border as means to develop electronic order of battle.

(MAR)

-China denounces the renaming of Siberian towns by USSR as attempt to conceal the historical realities of early Chinese control of that region.
-Russians announce plans to rename rivers and mountains in East.

(APR)

-Correspondents in Moscow say that officially unannounced border incidents have occurred during the past six months.

(MAY)

-A Reuters dispatch to the New York Times quotes LTG V. Matronsov, Chief of Soviet Border Forces,

TABIE 3 - Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
	<p>as suggesting the need for constant maneuvers on the Chinese border. (Matronsov was once a member of the border talk team.)</p> <p>-The Soviet newspaper, <u>Selskaya Zhizn</u> (Rural Life) reported two intruders in the Pamir region on the Chinese border were intercepted and killed, and that one Russian soldier lost his life.</p>
(JUL)	<p>-Chief Soviet Border Team Negotiator, Leonid F. Ilyichev returned to Moscow from his talks in Peking without apparent success or progress to report.</p> <p>-Despite strained relations between the two nations, a direct Moscow to Peking air route will be inaugurated. Border Talks to continue.</p>
(AUG)	<p>-The Soviet government, according to the <u>NY Times</u>, has adopted a new policy on internal immigration designed to settle more farmers along the Chinese border. Aimed, apparently, at affirming Soviet claims to boundary areas, special benefits will be granted to frontier settlers.</p> <p>-Border talks believed stalemated.</p> <p>-In the <u>London Times</u> word that China is resolved to have nuclear weapons that would deter the USSR from launching such an attack against her.</p> <p>-The <u>Secret War in Tibet</u>, book by French author Michael Peissel, published this month, details a force of some 5,000 - 8,000 Khamba guerrillas, who are forcing, the writer claims, China to maintain an occupational army of 300,000 in Tibet. The author further states that the USSR has "sought to link the Khambas" with dissident forces in Sinkiang.</p> <p>-In his report to the 10th Communist Party Congress, Chou En-Lai had both conciliatory and hard words for Moscow. While saying, "The Sino-Soviet boundary question should be settled peacefully through negotiations," the Chinese leader added, "Must China give away all the territory north of the Great Wall...to show...we are willing to improve Sino-Soviet relations?"</p>
(SEP)	<p>-The <u>Military Balance, 1973-1974</u> (IISS, London), released this month, places 25 percent of the Soviet Army's divisions along the Chinese border, but adds, China is steadily improving and increasing</p>

TABLE 3 -- Continued

The Date	Nature of Exchange
	<p>both conventional and nuclear capabilities.</p> <p>-Political observers in Peking report China has concentrated recent defense preparations on the northern border regions and along the Mongolian frontier. Also quote Chinese leaders as not ruling out the "long term possibility" of a "Soviet Blitzkrieg and preventive attack against China."</p>
(OCT)	<p>-Although one American expert is said to term Soviet divisions as "literally belled up along the Chinese border this summer," because of autumn weather problems, there can hardly be a Soviet attack on China until next year. (<u>LA Times</u>, 1 October 1973)</p>
(DEC)	<p>-A series of articles in early December (Kingsbury Smith, dateline Peking; C.L. Sulzberger in Paris; Joseph Alsop in Washington; and Joseph C. Harsch from Los Angeles) speak of China's increased nuclear capabilities, her continued anxiety over a possible Soviet preemptive strike, and the generally provocative and inherently unstable nature of the Sino Soviet border region---combined with and made worse by the persistence of unusually large Soviet divisionally force strength in the volatile area.</p>


*Entries for Table 3 extracted from the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, The Peking Review, other periodicals, with emphasis on the New York Times.

Figure A

LIU PEI-HUA MAP, "THE OLD DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ERA (1840-1919) - CHINESE TERRITORIES TAKEN BY IMPERIALISM

Reproduced from
best available copy.

MAP 2 "The Old Democratic Revolutionary Era (1840-1919) - Chinese Territories Taken by Imperialism."
From Liu Pei-hua, ed., *Chung kuo chin tai chien shih*, (A Short History of Modern China), (Peking: Ichang shu chih, 1954), following p. 253. Key numbers added for the present book.



1. The Great Northwest: seized by Imperial Russia under the Treaty of Chuguchak, 1864. [Parts of present Soviet Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, and Tadzhikistan.]

2. Pamirs: secretly divided between England and Russia in 1896.

17. The Great Northeast: seized by Imperial Russia under the Treaty of Aigun, 1858.

18. The Great Northeast: seized by Imperial Russia under the Treaty of Peking, 1860.

19. Sakhalin: divided between Russia and Japan.

A

Figure B

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

MILITARY REGIONS


- Military Region (M.R.) boundary
- Probable M.R. boundary
- Lanchou Nuclear or missile facility

NUCLEAR and MISSILE FACILITIES

- Sino-Soviet frontier
- Sino-Mongolian frontier

Troop strengths (regular army):

Peking MR (Habei, Shansi provinces, Inner Mongolia (part))	32 divisions
Shenyang MR (Liaoning, Kirin, Heilongjiang provinces, Inner Mongolia (part))	
Tsinan MR (Shantung province)	28 divisions
Nanking MR (Kiangsu, Anhwei, Chekiang provinces)	
Foochow MR (Kiangsi, Fukien provinces)	28 divisions
Wuhan MR (Honan, Hubei provinces)	
Canton MR (Hunan, Kwangtung, Kwangsi provinces, Hainan Island)	12 divisions
Chengtu MR (Szechwan province)	
Kunming MR (Yunnan, Kweichow provinces)	11 divisions
Lanchou MR (Tsinghai, Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi provinces)	
Tibet MR	3 divisions
Sinkiang MR	4 divisions




Nuclear and Missile Facilities

The installations at Lanchou, Haiyen and Paotou have been reported to be concerned with the production of fissile material, including uranium enrichment. Lop Nor is the principal testing site for atomic weapons. In addition to the facilities shown, there have been unconfirmed reports of installations connected with the atomic weapons and missile programmes at several other locations.




TERRITORIAL CHANGES

1689-1949



THE SINKIANG BORDER





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(Map by International Institute for Strategic Studies, London)

Figure B
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE



It has been reported to be concerned with the atomic weapons



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Figure C "ON THE RED USSURI SNOW"

(Poem)—ON THE RED USSURI SNOW. (By Yevg. Yevtushenko, Literaturnaya gazeta, No. 12, March 19, p. 12. Complete text.)

The mother's pepper mushrooms are waiting,
long since salted in the tub,
But her son has fallen
on the red Ussuri snow,
First shot point-blank,
then finished off with bayonets.
What for?
For his freckles?
For his blue eyes?
The photo of the bride,
where the earrings jangle merrily,
Is impaled
upon his pure boyish heart.
The old woman trudges,
her grief unmeasurable,
And the sky of Russia
slowly fills in the footprints.
Her dark kerchief
sadly low over her eyes.
"My sons,
my sons."
And she whispers—
(what do they mean to her—Mao—the hung weeping!)—
"Sons, were not enough of you
killed in the last war?!"
O, if Marx could see
how pitifully, vilely they play
The tragic farce
of the brazen-faced pseudo-Communist!
What becomes
of even a sacred idea
In the hands of a scoundrel!
How base, how stupid
to burn reproductions of Goya and El Greco!
Who tramples on culture
will trample on man.
History, remember:
hung-welpingism always becomes
Murderism.
Spattered here,
on the snow of red-stained March,
Are blood patches,
like books of Mao's sayings.
A heavy hand creeps across our border,
the Chinese God-khan.
He threatens powerlessly, cantingly,
tortured by an itch:
"Let's sterilize!"
And they take aim at truth and conscience,
rushing to gunports:
"Let's sterilize!"
And they dream of making our home land
a country where Pushkin and Shevchenko are banned,
Where in the fields not wheat grows,
but only quotations, quotations,
Where jaws savagely crunch
on art like sea lettuce,
Where Suzdal onionheads
go into octopus soup to spite it,
Where there is no Siberian talga,
for with one stroke
It has been cut down into frames for portraits
of the father of mankind, Mao,
Where Nyushka Burtova wheezes
and bends under her burden,
Lugging granite on her back
for a sculpture of the Great Helmsman,
Where a gray-haired professor
comes under a hail of rocks and putrid shrimps,
Where Maya Plisetskaya mixes
liquid cement with her ballet shoes,
Where the capitals of our republics
are under an imperial heel,

Where, as though to the tail of a mare,
Tupolev is tied to the tail of a plane,
Where their low-browed chauffeurs
insanely burn in bonfires
Vazha Pshavela's chonguri,
Vasily Tyorkin's accordion,
Where Zykin is put straight from the stage
into the dank dampness of a barrack,
Where the hung weeping rap
all the strings off the guitar of Bulat [Okudzhava],
Where horses with shaggy hooves
prance wildly
On the backs of Rasul [Gamzatov],
Kaliyev and Smelyakov
Where beggarly, barefoot,
Shostakovich trudges through the frost,
And where Andrei [Voznesensky] is forced
to write not "Oza"
but "Maoza."
It won't be! If we are forced to,
then, leaping into troop trains,
Not just for Rus and for faith—
for our fifteen republics,
For any little village or town
and for Chinese babies yet uncomprehending,
Tied on their peasant mothers' backs—
you and I will don our helmets.
Thus rose a border guard
with light fuzz above his lips
To shield Sun Yat-sen
from treacherous bullets!
Vladimir and Kiev,
you see in the smoking twilight
The new Batu Khans,
bombs rattling in their quivers.
But if they fire,
the warning bells will sound
And there'll be heroic warriors aplenty
for new battlefields of Kulikovo!

—[Translated by Steven Sha

[Notes.—The following Soviet figures are mentioned: Pshavela, Rasul Gamzatov, Kaysyn Kaliyev and Yarosl Smelyakov, poets; Andrei Tupolev, a leading aircraft designer; Vasily Tyorkin, mythical hero of poem by Aleksandr Tsvetkovsky—see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 13, pp. 20-30; Bulat Okudzhava, popular balladeer; Ly Zykina, singer; and Nyushka Burtova, a concrete worker of the section "Nyushka" in Yevtushenko's epic "The Hydroelectric Station."]

